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This is a scholarly work, utilising Chinese, Japanese and Korean sources to 
investigate the emergence of Social Darwinism and its role in the drive 
towards modernisation in Korea between 1880 and 1920. The writings of 
Herbert Spencer and American Social Darwinists had already appeared in 
China and Japan and though influential in these countries, they did not 
attain the importance they were to have in Korea. The author maintains 
that ‘pervasiveness’ is insufficient “to describe the meaning of the Social 
Darwinist gospel for Korea’s early modern intelligentsia. The impact was 
truly overwhelming. For some time (approximately between the 1900s and 
1920s) Social Darwinism functioned as a common, unifying mode of think-
ing for almost all the major groups and personalities of the modernisation-
oriented intelligentsia” (p. 8). The struggle for existence and the survival of 
the fittest were regarded as scientifically established cosmic processes 
producing a world of inexorable competition which selected the strong and 
eliminated the weak. For Social Darwinists in Korea, as in China and Japan, 
the struggle was not between individuals engaged in peaceful economic 
competition, as in Spencer’s theory, but between nations, and sometimes 
races, fighting for power, resources and prestige in a hostile, imperialist 
world. Hence “patriotic duty was considered to be the most effective form 
of interaction between subjects of the same state” (p. 13). Individual free-
dom was subordinated to the freedom of the state. 
The problem for Korea was that it was in a weak position in relation to 
its powerful neighbours, China and Japan. The latter occupied an ambi-
valent status in Korea: as a model of modernisation and military prowess 
demonstrated by its recent defeats of China and Russia, but also as a 
potential threat to national autonomy, realised by Japan’s annexation of 
Korea in 1910. Hence Korea could be considered a loser in the struggle for 
survival, and perhaps doomed to elimination as a nation. But the Korean 
elite—intellectuals, government officials and social and political leaders—
deployed Social Darwinism as a radical ideology challenging traditional 
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Korean culture and behaviour. During the period under consideration 
Social Darwinism denounced the status quo “in the strongest possible 
language, since it was obvious that Korea in its contemporaneous shape 
had no hope of ‘survival’ in an uncompromisingly brutal Darwinian 
world” (p. 196). Social Darwinism promoted radical mobilisation to moder-
nise the nation because to be “saved from inevitable doom, Korea had to be 
changed almost beyond recognition” (p. 197). This process required the 
introduction of modern capitalism, the cultivation of science, a national 
education programme to equip the population with the knowledge neces-
sary for a modern nation, and for physical education and martial training—
‘civilised masculinity’—in order to defend the nation and promote its 
interests in the international arena. Tikhonov emphasises that this radi-
calism was not extended to the political domain—the Social Darwinists 
came from the Korean elites and were monarchists, not democratic republi-
cans, convinced that change should be instituted from above. 
In this drive to modernity Korean Social Darwinists were often critical 
of traditional ethical codes embodied in Confucianism and Buddhism. The 
former, with its disdain for politics and its scholarly and gentlemanly 
pursuit of learning and wisdom, was accused of weakening the nation, 
rendering its population ill-equipped to deal with the imperatives of 
survival and success in the modern world. But Confucianism remained 
popular in Korea, causing some Social Darwinists to accommodate Confu-
cian ethics, although this produced a tension between the cosmic 
imperative of the struggle for survival among nations and personal ethical 
codes. This synthesis was also attempted with Buddhism—for example, by 
claiming that the law of competition was a temporary feature of the 
material world that could only be adequately interpreted by Buddhism. 
Similar accommodations were made with Christianity, which was influen-
tial in Korea. Tikhonov’s account and analysis of these developments 
graphically illustrate a feature of Social Darwinism that is also evident in 
European and American versions, namely its flexibility and capacity for 
appropriation by a range of ideologies that could appear to be inimical to 
the focus on competition and the survival of the fittest.   
Tikhonov’s detailed presentation of Korean Social Darwinism is a very 
important contribution to the study of Social Darwinism, extending its 
history beyond the European and American contexts. However, I have 
some reservations concerning his presentation of the content of Social 
Darwinism. His account of the latter is fairly brief and focusses upon the 
struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. But there is much more 
to Social Darwinism than this. It is a theory of organic change in which 
heredity plays a crucial role: natural selection acts upon biologically gene-
rated variations to produce ‘fitness’. Because the unit of inheritance was 
unknown at the time many nineteenth century Darwinists also endorsed 
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Lamarck’s theory of the ‘inheritance of acquired characters’ according to 
which organic variations were produced by adaptations to environmental 
conditions and inherited by subsequent generations. Many American and 
European Social Darwinists synthesised these theories. Furthermore, they 
recognised that humans, though sharing an ancestry with apes, had 
evolved complex cultures and socio-political organisations which also 
evolved. For example Spencer described a development from militant to 
industrial societies that entailed changes in the mechanisms of selection—
from warfare between groups in the first type to non-violent economic 
competition between individuals in the second. For Social Darwinists, then, 
culture was driven by selective mechanisms that were also part of the 
evolutionary process.   
Yet the author largely ignores the roles of heredity, cultural evolution 
and modes of selection in Social Darwinism. If this is due to its absence or 
minimal importance for Korean Social Darwinists it surely requires an 
explanation, particularly in light of their acquaintance with Spencer. In his 
theory natural selection, inheritance of acquired characteristics and social 
evolution were fundamental. Consequently, it is difficult to decide the 
extent to which Social Darwinist discourse is really the foundation of some 
of the doctrines Tikhonov discusses. For example, his account of Korean 
nationalism highlights its stress on duty, honour, and the subordination of 
individual interests to the success of the nation in the context of warfare 
among states. However, such sentiments do not in themselves constitute 
Social Darwinism. Some of the passages cited by Tikhonov are similar in 
tone to those expressed in 1896 by the German theorist of Machtpolitik, 
Heinrich von Treitschke, who eulogised warfare between states. For him 
“only brave peoples” have a future, while the weak perish, and justly so. 
The “grandeur of history lies in the perpetual conflict of nations.” But 
Treitschke did not derive this conflict from the pressure of population on 
limited resources; on the contrary he was disdainful of materialist explana-
tions for warfare. A nation’s task was to assert its place in the hierarchy of 
nations. People “sacrificed their lives for the sake of patriotism: here we 
have the sublimity of war.”1 Warfare could thus be justified without Social 
Darwinism. Moreover, the latter could be adopted by pacifists and anti-
militarists who interpreted war as responsible for an unnatural contra-
selection in which the fit were eliminated, leaving the unfit to propagate 
the next generation, which would inherit their inferiority. Tikhonov 
acknowledges the rejection of imperialism and modern warfare by Spencer 
and Sumner but provides very little discussion of how such rejections were 
legitimated by Social Darwinist theorising.    
                                                          
1 Heinrich von Treitschke, Politics, 2 vols, transl. by B. Dugdale and T. de Bille, 
London: Constable, 1916, I I21-2; II, pp. 395-396. 
Reviews                                                                                                  133 
 
Another consequence of the failure to provide a more detailed account 
of Social Darwinism is Tikhonov’s insistence on a radical distinction 
between the former and Marxian socialism, which maintained that social 
norms and behaviour were the product of socio-economic conditions (p. 7). 
Hence the remorseless struggle typical of capitalist societies would be 
eradicated by a socialist mode of production. But this ignores the many 
examples of the enlistment of Social Darwinism in the cause of socialist 
revolution or radical reform. An example would be the German Marxist 
August Bebel, who published his highly popular Die Frau und der 
Sozialismus in 1879. Bebel acknowledged that the struggle for existence was 
paramount throughout natural and human history but claimed that its 
intensity under capitalism was its final manifestation. Socialism would 
eradicate scarcity and the new social environment would gradually elimi-
nate conflict and inequality. This was feasible because adaptation to a 
different environment would profoundly change human nature. Bebel 
relies upon a Lamarckian view of change to explain how human evolution 
would evolve under socialism. 
In contrast, the English socialist and co-discoverer of natural selection, 
Alfred Russel Wallace, insisted in his Social Environment and Moral Progress 
(1913) that human character was inherited and could not be altered by 
environmental change but only by selection. He adamantly rejected the 
policies of eugenicists, arguing instead for sexual selection. Equality, eco-
nomic independence and improved education for women would enable 
them to choose their marriage partners, which would result in them 
selecting the best specimens while rejecting violent, incapable and weak 
males who would be unable to reproduce and perpetuate their defects. 
Socio-political change is here depicted as a precondition for selection to be 
effective. These examples of socialist uses of Social Darwinism illustrate the 
difficulty of sharply separating it from socialism, as well as underlining the 
importance of selection and inheritance in the latter.2 
One final point: Tikhonov argues that Social Darwinism was not 
employed by feminists in Korea, but it would be interesting to investigate 
this in Korea, Japan and other Asian states. The existence and importance 
of feminist appropriations of Social Darwinism in the West remained 
                                                          
2  For analyses of socialist uses of Social Darwinism see Richard Weikart, 
Socialist Darwinism: Evolution in German Socialist Thought from Marx to 
Bernstein (London/San Fransico: Bethseda, 1999); David Stark, The First Darwinian 
Left: Socialism and Darwinism 1859-1914 (Cheltenham: Clarion Press, 2003). Stark (p. 
3) argues that: “The language of Darwinism became, for a time, the language of 
socialism.” 
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unnoticed until fairly recently, even by feminists.3 This is a not a criticism 
but a suggestion which, as with my critical comments, has been provoked 
by the author’s scholarly, stimulating and original text. 
 
                                                          
3 For a discussion of this see Mike Hawkins, “Social Darwinism and Female 
Education, 1870-1920,” in F. Bernstorff and A. Langewand, Darwinismus, Bildung, 
Erziehung (Berlin: Lit, 2012), pp. 13-31. 
